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ABSTRACT
In spite of the initial skepticism shown by national and international me-
dia, Brazil's new antitrust law (Law 12.529/11), which replaced Law 8.884/
94, since coming into force, has brought several improvements for the Bra-
zilian competition protection policy. Among the substantial structural
changes made, one must note that the main change was, undoubtedly, the
institution of the pre-merger analysis. The referred alterations, however,
have proved to be insufficient in regards to the numerous challenges gener-
ated by the new system, creating the additional need for innovations also in
the managerial field. Therefore, the present work aims to present and ana-
lyze such managerial innovations created by CADE's General-Superinten-
dence team, which have enabled the implementation of the new pre-merger
analysis system established by Law 12.259/11.
KEYWORDS: Pre-merger Analysis-CADE's General-Superintendence-
Managerial Innovations-Law 12.259/11-CADE.
I. INTRODUCTION
N August 2012, The Economist magazine, using a free translation,
called the a posteriori control of mergers a "Brazilian oddity."' This
evaluation reflected the reaction to an outdated system for the man-
agement of transactions, which resulted in terms and analyses that were
longer than the ones observed in developed countries. Only a few less
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1. "[This] year has seen the demise of a Brazilian oddity: an antitrust regime that
allowed companies to merge first and the regulator to ask questions only later." A
Champion for Choice?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2012), available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/21560892.
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influential economies adopted a system similar to ours, allowing the
transaction to be completed before the approval by the competition
authority.
Despite the fact that Brazil's competition policy has evolved ever since
Law 8.884/94 came into force, from the beginning of 2000, there had been
the feeling that something needed to be done.2 Despite the extensive
managerial work purported by the three previous bodies of the Brazilian
System for Competition Protection (SBDC) under Law 8.884/94, 3 without
drastic structural changes, there was little room for evolution. The ex
post analysis system was antagonistic to the best international practices,
and it was aggravated by the heavy bureaucratic structure composed of
three analytic bodies, known as the "three counters."'4 The result was an
inefficient system, with approval deadlines which were incompatible with
the dynamics of global economy, as well as the ineffective policy. 5
The government, aware of the relevance of the competition protection
policy for the country's economic development and after years of discus-
sion within the legislative and executive powers, granted maximum prior-
ity to the pending bill in the National Congress, including it in the growth
acceleration programme (PAC). 6 Thus, by the end of 2011, the Congress
enacted Law 12.259, which would eventually solve a good portion of the
2. One of the conclusions of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment's (OECD) last Peer Review of the Brazilian competition policy was that the
new antitrust law should adopt a pre-merger review system. See generally OECD,
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIl: A Pt:ER i REVIEw 2010, (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362.pdf.
3. Under Law 8.884/1994 there were three antitrust bodies in Brazil: (i) the Secreta-
riat for Economic Monitoring (Seae) from the Ministry of Finance; (ii) the Secreta-
riat for Economic Law (SDE) from the Ministry of Justice; and (iii) the
Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) an independent agency.
The first two secretariats were responsible for rendering opinion on mergers and
for conducting investigation on anticompetitive practices. CADE, in its turn, was
the tribunal responsible for judging these cases on the administrative level. See
generally Lei No. 8.884/94, de 1H de Junho de 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL IDA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 13.6.1994 (Braz.), available at http://www.pianalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
leis/18884.htm.
4. OECD, supra note 2, at 11.
5. See id.
6. Created in 2007, during President Lula's second mandate, the PAC promoted the
recovery of the planning and execution of major infrastructure projects of social,
urban, logistics and energetic relevance for the country, contributing to its rapid
and sustainable development. The economic measures for growth acceleration en-
compassed the following: (i) Credit Stimulus and Financing; (ii) Improvement of
the Investment Environment; (iii) Tax Relief and Management; (iv) Long-term
Fiscal Measures; and (v) Fiscal Consistency. The reform of Brazil's antitrust policy
was included as one of the most important measures to be taken in order to attract
investments. TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DE UNIAO [COURT OF UNION ACCOUNTS], Ru-
IATORIO E PAR CER PRIVIO SOl:RE AS CONTAS DO GOVERNO IDA RI-PUBILICA
EXERCICIO DIE 2009 [PRELIMINARY REPORT AND OPINION ON GOVERNMENT AC-
COUNTS OF TlE RIPUBI IC YE AR 2009] 169 (2009), available at http://portal2.tcu
.gov.br/portal/page/portal/TCU/comunidades/contas/contas-governo/contas_09/
Textos/CG%202009%2ORelatC3%B3rio.pdf; see also Melhoria do Ambiente de
Investimento [Improvement of the Investment Environment], MINISTl-RIO DO PLA
NEJAMENTO, http://www.pac.gov.br/sobre-o-pac/medidas/melhoria-do-ambiente-
de-investimento (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
PRE-MERGER ANALYSIS IN BRAZIL
structural problems known to all agents. Nevertheless, great challenges
remained, because the new law clearly lacked managerial solutions for
the implementation of the new system of prior analysis of mergers and
acquisitions. These solutions were created by employees in the SBDC's
three bodies, while handling their increasingly demanding workloads.
A few months before Law 12.259/11 came into force, several agents
went to the press willing to express their concerns regarding the new sys-
tem. Various pieces, political in nature, were published in a number of
magazines and newspapers despite not devoted to specializing in reports
on the economy. For example, the newspaper 0 Globo published a piece
on April 22, 2012, emphasizing the concern regarding the lack of person-
nel for the functioning of the new CADE.7 Exame magazine was even
more emphatic. In a long piece, published on June 13, 2012, it highlighted
the excessive bureaucracy of the new body, affirming that with the new
competition law, "[i]f an iron and steel mill buys a supermarket, it will
have to present 58 documents [to the 'Supercade'].' '8 In Germany, it
would suffice to send a letter.9 The criticism harshened in the rest of the
piece-stating with regard to complex transactions, the old system re-
quired thirty-five documents, while the new one required 140.10 The
magazine then continued criticizing the excess of bureaucracy of the new
model, pointing out that there would be an overdose of papers even in
transactions under the fast track procedure.1 ' Lastly, it estimated that an
opinion would take up to forty-five days to be issued and that Supercade
could stay inert for months. 12
The diagnosis reflected in the national press showed that there was a
great chance that the new competition protection system would actually
deteriorate the conditions for companies dealing with CADE. Part of
this diagnosis resulted from the low expectations created by a negative
record regarding the managerial results of the competition protection
bodies. These results showed that analysis took an excessive amount of
time-sometimes longer than two years. 13 The other part of the diagno-
sis came from the staffing problems of the new body.1 4
SBDC's incapacity to deal with the ever-growing stock of mergers was
notorious on top of its mission to fight off cartels and unilateral activi-
7. Falta de pessoal ameaga infcio de funcionamento do Supercade [Lack of Personnel
Threat Early Preparation of the Super-CADE], 0 G1o,0o (Apr. 22, 2012), http://
oglobo.globo.com/economia/falta-de-pessoal-ameaca-inicio-de-funcionamento-do-
super-cade-4711776.
8. Patrick Cruz, Lei da concorrincia veio para facilitar e complicou [Competition law







13. OECD, supra note 2, at 41.
14. OECD, supra note 2, at 47.
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ties.15 In regards to the mergers, there lacked a clear policy in order to
deal with the ordering of the mergers that were presented due to the
growing stock and the reduced number of technicians. 16 Even after the
adoption of the fast track procedure in 2000, which provided an addi-
tional life span to the old system with considerable gains in productivity,
the stock or mergers would not stop growing 17 Therefore, the logic was
basically to administer the increasing volume of stock, rather than the
income and outcome flow of mergers.' 8
This paper aims to detail the creation process of managerial solutions,
which culminated in new CADE's positive performance during its first
two years. We will demonstrate the path designed by its employees, start-
ing with the approval procedure of Law 12.259/2011, including the
description of structural changes and the transition work. Then, we will
describe the managerial solutions developed, in order to ultimately
achieve the results that were obtained.
II. THE TRANSITION TO THE NEW COMPETITION LAW
In 2005, the Brazilian Government forwarded to the National Congress
Bill 5.877, which intended to restructure the Brazilian Competition Pro-
tection System. Generally speaking, it established the unification of the
bodies of the system and the adoption of the pre-merger thresholds. 19 In
2007, the bill regarding the restructuring of the competition protection
policy was included as one of the priorities of the January 22nd Growth
Acceleration Program (PAC), instituted by Decree 6.025.20 After that in-
clusion, the restructuring of SBDC became a priority.
Two years after its inclusion in the PAC, the project of restructuring of
the Brazilian competition protection policy was approved by the House
of Representatives. 2' A year later, it was approved by the Senate. 22 Fi-
nally it was definitively approved by the House of Representatives on
October 5, 2011.23 Law 12.529/11 was enacted by the president a little
15. The management changes related to this point are based on Chapter 1-Strategic
Planning and Prioritisation-of the International Competition Network (ICN)'s
Competition Agency Practice Manual. See INT'L CoMimErliON Ni ;FWORK,
AGiENCY EFFEGUC-IVENESS: COMIETITION AGENCY PRACU'ICE MANUAL, 25 (2010),
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc744
.pdf.
16. See OECD, supra note 2, at 77.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Id.
19. Lei No. 5.877/05, de 12 de Setembro de 2005, CAMARA i)OS DIuuAIDos de
9.12.2005 (Braz.).
20. See Decreto No. 6.025, de 22 de Janeiro de 2007, D.O.U. de 22.1.2007 (Braz), avail-
able at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/_Ato2007-2010/2007/Decreto/D6025
.htm.
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less than two months after, on November 30, 2011.24 During this time
period, there was much debate, many agents were involved, and various
modifications were made to Bill 5.877/2005.25 But the basic backbone
was kept intact; namely, the institution of the system of ex ante analysis
of mergers and the joinder of the tasks of the three bodies of the SBDC
into a single body, which would keep the former name CADE but would
present a structure more compatible to current challenges. 2 6 Below is a
brief discussion of the changes that had a significant impact on the new
antitrust model.
A. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE COMPETITION PROTECTION MODEL
As previously mentioned, one of the main changes was the transforma-
tion of the a posteriori control of the mergers to a prior control, which is
one that prevents companies from closing their transactions before
CADE's approval.27 With this change, the imposition of measures that
restrict competition were more easily implemented and less traumatic to
the economy as a whole. Further, it placed the competition protection
policy in a more equalitarian position with the main jurisdictions of the
world, which also facilitated the cooperation in the handling of interna-
tional transactions. 28
The model's other fundamental change was the joinder of tasks of the
three Brazilian antitrust bodies in the new CADE. SDE was terminated
and replaced within the structure of the Ministry of Justice by the Na-
24. CONS-iHO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFENSE ECONOMICA [ADMIN. COUNCIL IFOR
ECON. DEi.] (CADE), DEFENSE DE CONCORRIINCIE NO BRASIL: 50 ANOS [COMPE-
TrI'ION POLICY IN BRAZIL: 50 YEARS] 139 (2013), available at http:#www.cade
.gov.br/publicacoes/livro/CADE_-_DEFESADA CONCORRENCIA NOBRA
SIL 50 ANOS.pdf; see generally Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011
D.O.U. de 30.11.2011 (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
ato201l-2014/2011/Lei/L12529.htm.
25. CONSAiuiO ADMINISTRATIVO DE DEFESA ECONOMICA [ADMIN. COUNCIL FOR
ECON. DEF.] (CADE), DEFESA DA CONCORRIRNCIA NO BRAS.,: 50 ANOS [COMPE-
TITION POLICY IN BRAZIl.: 50 YEARS] (2013), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
publicacoes/livro/CADE_-_DEFESADACONCORRENCIANOBRASIL_50
ANOS.pdf.
26. See generally Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011
(Braz.).
27. OECD, supra note 2, at 78.
28. After Law 12.529/11 came into force, CADE considerably increased its interaction
with the world's most important antitrust agencies. Some international merger re-
views were carried out together with foreign agencies, which led to a significant
exchange of information and ideas including discussions on the necessary remedies
to be adopted in order to reduce the potential negative impact of the mergers on
competition. Some examples of this new phase were the following cases: Merger
Review No. 08700.006437/2012-13 (Syniverse Holdings e WP Roaming Ill) and
Merger Review No. 08700.009882/2012-35 (Munksjo AB and Ahlstrom Corpora-
tion). Both cases were approved by CADE's Tribunal following the parties' sign-
ing of commitments (ACC), and after extensive information exchange between
CADE and the European Commission. For copies of these decisions, see Sei,
CADE, http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/processo-pesquisar.php?
acaoexterna=protocolo-pesquisar&acao-origem-externa=protocolo-pesquisar&
id-orgao.acesso externo=0 (last visited May 8, 2015).
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tional Consumer Secretariat, which could also be considered a positive
aspect of the new law because it strengthens a very relevant policy for
society.29 Seae remained as a part of SBDC, but with a role devoted only
to competition advocacy due to its performance over the last few years. 30
This change aimed mostly at extinguishing what was formerly known as
the "three counters" of SBDC. 31 In order to clear a merger in Brazil, the
companies had to wait for the approval by three distinct bodies, which
were physically separated and had frequent communication problems, re-
quiring double efforts. 32
After Law 12.529/11, the tasks performed by the former Seae (except
for the competition advocacy) were incorporated to a new body called
CADE's General-Superintendence (GS). 33 This body, which will be the
focus of the present work, also gained an attribution that plays a very
relevant role in the new model adopted by the new Brazilian antitrust
legislation-the power to review and decide on the transactions where
there is no need for the application of competitive restrictions (i.e., ones
that have no chance of having negative impacts on prices and/or quality
in Brazil). 34 On the other hand, all the mergers that have some kind of
restriction suggested by the GS must be ruled on by CADE's tribunal35
and the administrative tribunal, which investigates breaches in the eco-
nomic order and offer recommendations for filing or conviction. 36
Hence, the more relevant cases, which in a way contribute to the defi-
nition of the competition protection policy, are defined in the ruling ses-
sions of the administrative tribunal. The Tribunal then becomes
essentially a judicial body, which determines CADE's case law and the
country's competition protection policy, leaving the reproduction of in-
structions behind.3 7
Another legal innovation created by the new Brazilian competition
law-a requirement which makes the submission to CADE of a given
merger mandatory-also deserves attention in this paper. Under Law
29. Jos6 Gabriel Navarro, Governo federal cria a Senacon [Federal government creates
Senacon], JORNAI I)A TARDE (May 31, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://blogs.estadao
.com. br/advogado-de-defesalgoverno-federal-cria-a-senacon/.
30. OECD, supra note 2, at 79.
31. See Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 4
(Braz.).
32. Cruz, supra note 8.
33. OECD, supra note 2 at 57.
34. Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 13 XII,
art. 54 1, art. 57, I (Braz.).
35. Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 13 X11
and art. 57 II (Braz.).
36. Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 13 VII-
VIII (Braz.).
37. CADE's Tribunal is active in all the administrative proceedings opened to investi-
gate anticompetitive conducts and all mergers contested by the GS. But the Tribu-
nal has the power to arrogate any merger approved by the GS. See Lei No. 12.529/
11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art 65 II (Braz.); Resoluqdo
No. 1, de 29 de Maio de 2012 D.O.U. de 31.5.2012, art. 122 II (Braz.), available at
http://cade.gov.br/upload!Resolugdo%201_2012 %20-%20RICA DE%20(2).pdf
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8.884/94, the submission of any transaction which involved an economic
group with gross revenues of more than R$400 million in the year prior to
the transaction, with rare exceptions, was considered to be mandatory.3 8
This resulted in the overcrowding of SBDC with transactions that were
mostly fairly simple from a competition standpoint. Needless to say, the
mandatory character represented a considerable waste of both public and
private resources, which resulted in inefficiency. 39 After Law 12.529/11
was enacted, only the submission of transactions that involve an eco-
nomic group with gross revenues greater than BRL 750 million and at
least one more group with a gross revenues over BRL 75 million are con-
sidered to be mandatory. 40
Along with this innovation, which helped to drastically reduce the
number of mergers presented to CADE, came another equally important
creation, namely the possibility of regulating the mandatory notification
thresholds upon indication by the CADE's tribunal, followed by a joint
ordinance from the Ministries of Economy and Justice. This measure was
adopted after the first day of effectiveness of Law 12.529/11 (May 30,
2012) with Interministerial Ordinance MF/MJ 994/12, elevating the
figures of its mandatory filing thresholds (established in its article 88) to
R$750 million and R$75 million.41
Finally, one has yet to emphasize the rules brought by the new law in
regards to the rejection of notifications, via amendment. This point is of
great relevance because it encourages the parties in a transaction to pre-
sent all the information referring to it at the first opportunity, under pen-
alty of rejection and amendment (which can only happen once) by the
General-Superintendence. The amendment is the only time in the review
procedure of a merger when its review term is interrupted and reinitiated
because the information initially presented was considered to be insuffi-
cient for a decision by the General-Superintendence. 42 Therefore, only
when the parties notify CADE about the answer to such an amendment,
does the review term begin again. 43 Furthermore, in the event the answer
to the amendment is not accepted by the General-Superintendence be-
cause it still contains defects and irregularities capable of hindering the
judgment of the merits, the penalty will be the filing of the proceedings
without the analysis of the merits.44
38. Lei No. 8.884/94, de 11 de Junho de 1994, D.O.U. de 13.6.1994, art. 54, 3 (Braz.)
(which was overhauled by Lei No. 12.529/11).
39. See OECD, supra note 2, at 7.
40. Id.
41. See Portaria Interministerial No. 994, de 30 de Maio de 2012, GABIN*ETE Do MNIS-




44. Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 53, 1
(Braz.); see also Resoluqdo No. 1, de 29 de Maio de 2012, D.O.U. de 31.5.2012, art.
111 (Braz.).
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Before proceeding to the next topic of this paper, it is important to
mention that the mistrust in the new CADE was clearly demonstrated by
the market's level of tension soon after the enactment of Law 12.529/11.
And this level of tension was externalized by the media, as shown in some
examples already discussed.45 The most interesting part is that all of this
negative news was published not only after the promulgation of Law
12.529/11 (some even after its coming into force), but also after the publi-
cation of all of CADE's main infralegal regulations. 46 This signals that
the market had a great mistrust of the new CADE's management ability.
After all, even though the structural improvements were evident, they
could be deemed innocuous without adequate management. Neverthe-
less, as will be demonstrated, the work was already being developed way
before these critics, trying to anticipate the main challenges to come.
B. TRANSITION WORKS FOR LAW No. 12.529/2011
Soon after the approval of SBDC's restructuring project by the Senate,
and its forwarding to the House of Representatives for the final delibera-
tion, President Dilma Roussef took office. 47 After the initial concern
over the degree of priority that would be given to this project by the new
president, the Minister of Justice, Jos6 Eduardo Cardozo, confirmed the
new government's support of the project's approval. 48 Therefore, the
leadership of the SBDC (in particular SDE and CADE) decided to initi-
ate the preparation for the changes at the beginning of 2011. There was
much that needed to be discussed, from the infralegal framework that
would have to be created, to the budget and personnel issues, the new
physical structure, organizational charts, the compatibilization of differ-
ent organizational cultures in a single body and, perhaps one of the main
points, how to make the new system of prior analysis of mergers work in
such a way so as to not frustrate the expectations surrounding the new
Brazilian competition protection system.
The preparation for the transition process was then initiated. It was
thought that the process could unravel at any time because the six month
period of vacatio legis would hardly be enough to solve all the issues in a
satisfactory manner. Hence, CADE's commissioners and employees, be-
sides SDE's and Seae's employees--which would be incorporated to the
45. See A Champion for Choice?, supra note 1.
46. See generally Cruz, supra note 8; see also Molan Gaban & Juliana Oliveira Dom-
ingues, Nova Lei permitird a cria9do de monop6lios [New law will allow the crea-
tion of monopolies], FoiIhA DE SAO PAULO (July 8, 2012), http://wwwl.folha.uol
.com.br/fsp/opiniao/53304-nova-lei-permitira-a-criacao-de-monopolios.shtml (an
example of this negative news).
47. Dilma Rousseffsworn in as Brazil's new president, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2011, 10:17
PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-12103312 (providing President
Dilma Rousseff was sworn into office on January 1, 2011, succeeding Luis lndcio
Lula da Silva).
48. Gilberto Costa, Para Ministro da Justiga novo CADE deve acelerar tramitagio de
processos de defesa concorrencial, AGfI-NCIA BRASIL (Oct. 6, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://
memoria.ebc.com.br/agenciabrasil/noticia/2011-10-06/para-ministro-da-justica-
novo-cade-deve-acelerar-tramitacao-de-processos-de-defesa-concorrencial.
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new antitrust body, according to the provisions in the bill-were distrib-
uted in six groups, supervised by CADE's commissioners. These six
groups were entrusted with the task of discussing, analyzing, and propos-
ing actions to facilitate the transition. Therefore, in the first semester of
2011, the transition groups for the preparation of the "New CADE" were
formed.
The six groups were (a) the New Headquarters, responsible for evalu-
ating the demand for a physical space that would accommodate the in-
crease in the number of staff members and the peculiarities of the
activities to be conducted; (b) Structure and Organizational Chart, which
studied the structure of the positions, offices, and people that would be
necessary in order to fulfill the new competences, including the function-
ing of the General-Superintendence, the Economic Study Department,
and the Federal Attorney's Office, together with CADE's Tribunal; (c)
Information Technology, created to identify technologic solutions that are
more efficient and more adequate to new CADE; (d) Infralegal Rules,
responsible for reviewing the existing rules, including new ones and edit-
ing the Internal Regulations; and (e) Mobilization and Alignment, en-
trusted with the task of motivating and boosting the participation of all
employees in the transition work, as well as providing the exchange of
information between the groups by means of newsletters. 49
Besides the ones mentioned above, the pre-merger review group was
also created and tasked with identifying the best competition protection
practices at an international level. This group can be considered as the
most important for the implementation of the new model, and it will be
explained in detail below. Its main results were (i) the structuring of the
General-Superintendence; (ii) the new information forms for the notifica-
tion of mergers, creating specific forms for fast track and ordinary pro-
49. The main results of each transition group were the following: (a) New Headquar-
ters: renting of headquarters in the end of Asa Norte, in Brasilia, which could
accommodate the new employees incorporated from SDE and Seae; (b) Structure
and Organizational chart-the task of this group was to study the necessary struc-
ture for the new CADE, which would receive the tasks previously performed by
SDE and Seae, and create an organizational chart of the whole organization which
had to reflect both the new tasks and the new procedural flows. This group had a
strong interaction with the pre-merger analysis group, aiming at reflecting the new
flows created in the institutional design of the new CADE; (c) Information Tech-
nology: the primary task of this group was to study several possibilities of new
systems presented, aiming at providing the new CADE with an informational sys-
tem capable of satisfying both the internal public and the external one. This sys-
tem is currently under development, but it is partly functioning; (d) Infralegal
Rules: this group delivered as a main product CADE's new Internal Regulations,
performing great revision work of both the old Regulations and the infralegal rules
of the former SBDC's two Secretariats, which needed to be adapted to the new
system; and (e) Mobilization and Alignment: this groups played a fundamental
strategic role in the formation of the new CADE, in the sense that it sought to
align all the expectations of employees from the three bodies with what was being
done by the six transition groups. The open communication between the managers
and the employees, with regular presentations in CADE's Plenary, directed to eve-
ryone, was crucial for the motivation process of SBDC's employees, reducing the
resistance to change, common in these scenarios.
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ceedings; (iii) a Resolution by CADE (Resolution 02/2012) aimed at
regulating the new procedure of prior analysis of mergers, also specifying
new criteria for submission; and (iv) the definition of the new procedural
workflow within the General-Superintendence. 50
C. THE WORK PLAN OF THE PRE-MERGER REVIEW
TRANSITION GROUP
In the first semester of 2011, several meetings with Brazilian and for-
eign lawyers that worked along with CADE were conducted. 51 They
tried to identify the main deficiencies present and confirmed CADE's di-
agnosis. Along with these meetings with the main agents of Brazil's anti-
trust policy, the pre-merger group initiated benchmarking studies with
the best international practices related to the system of ex ante analysis of
mergers.52 First, twenty questionnaires were sent to foreign authorities,
with questions related to the functioning of their respective pre-merger
systems, such as regulations adopted, organizational structures, informa-
tion level required in notification forms, deadlines, procedural flows,
etc.53 Some of the twenty consulted agencies responded to the inquiry
performed by CADE.54
After these initial consultations, part of the pre-merger group set in
loco interviews with authorities from some agencies that were chosen for
technical reasons (i.e., their notorious expertise in competition protec-
tion) and also for strategic reasons because some of the chosen agencies
had recently undergone similar transition procedures.55 It was not possi-
ble to import a ready-made model, without adaptations to the Brazilian
reality, in particular because of the inequality between the number of
technicians available at these agencies and the number of analyses of
mergers performed each year.
After the pre-merger transition team concluded that all of the products
they had envisaged in their initial project, which was delivered on January
31, 2012 (almost four months before the new law would come into force),
they were presented for validation and adjustments to all other teams, as
well as to the leaderships in both CADE and SDE.56 The products and
50. ESCOLA NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRA(AO Put LICA [NATIONAL SCHOOL OF PUBLIC
AI:)MINISTRATION], AOis PR IMIADAS NO 18o CONCURSO INOVA(:AO NA G's-rAo
P0131iCA FrEI)RAI-2013 [AWARDED SHARES TIIF 18-i CONTEST INNOVATION IN
MANAGEMENT FEiDERAL PUBLIc-2013] 179 (Pedro Luis Costa Cavalcante, et al.
eds., 2013), available at http://www.enap.gov.br/images//livro-acoes-premiadas_18
_concurso.pdf [hereinafter ESCOLA NACIONAL D7 AIMINISTRAzAo P0LICA].
51. Id. at 189.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. For instance, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Spain, France and United States of
America. See id.
55. Lauro Jardim, 0 CADE vai d Europa [CADE going to Europe], VIJA (Jan. 6,
2012, 5:54 PM), http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar-on-line/governo/o-cade-vai-a-
europa/.
56. Dirigentes do SBDC elaboram proposta de novo Regimento Interno [SBDC Lead-
ers Prepare Proposed New Bylaws], CONSEiIo AIMINISTRATIVO DE DiEDFESA
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main results of each team were presented at seminars organized in places
outside the headquarters of the referred bodies in two phases.57 During
the seminars, each point of the products was discussed, through individ-
ual presentations, followed by a debate. The key objective of these en-
counters was to validate the main products developed during the
transition phase, in order to present them to the Brazilian society by
means of public inquiries.58
The main product developed by the pre-merger team which was sub-
jected to a public consultation was the Resolution that would regulate the
mergers, including the two notification forms (fast track and ordinary
proceedings), as well as its annexes.59 Hundreds of contributions were
received during the public consultation process-many of them have
been incorporated into the final versions of the texts-and were all duly
answered. The participation of the major national agents and even of
some international ones, such as the American Bar Association, was of
great value to the development of the regulation which gave rise to
CADE's Resolution 02/2012, as soon as Law 12.529/11 first came into
effect.
III. THE MANAGERIAL INNOVATIONS INSERTED BY CADE
After all the above mentioned, the structural changes promoted by the
new Brazilian antitrust law would not be erfough to guarantee, on their
own, the good functioning of the new pre-merger system. 60 With time, it
became clear to the transition group responsible for thinking up the new
pre-merger model, that a procedural flow focused on a model of prioritiz-
ing the proceedings needed to be adopted. This was the only way the new
body would be able to overcome the challenge of rendering higher qual-
ity analyses of mergers faster and more efficiently.
Moreover, all the inefficiency of the old a posteriori control of mergers
regime should be completely reversed. This is because a prior control
would demand that the decisions of the mergers by the new CADE be
conducted quickly enough in order to avoid preventing hundreds of
transactions of mergers and acquisitions between companies that occur
ECONOMICA (CADE), http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?c97d8d9c74a97e8591
be8ed969ee (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
57. The first seminar was held on February 1, 2012, and the second between February
27 and March 2, 2012, both at the Israel Pinheiro Convention Center, in Brasilia.
See id.
58. See id.
59. These two filing forms were published for public consultation by CADE on March
2012. See Consultas Ptiblicas Concluidas, CADE, http://www.cade.gov.br/Default
.aspx?62d524f50f04181bef5def471f21 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
60. As previously said in item 2.1 of this paper, the new Brazilian antitrust law solved
part of the structural problems, for example, reducing the inefficiency generated
by the "three counters" by transforming them into one single body and all the
costs derived from this system, and also creating one more threshold to be consid-
ered for the prior notice of mergers.
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annually in Brazil.61 Therefore, the success of the new CADE depended
on innovative managerial solutions in order to overcome the operational
difficulties of a pre-merger system.
The managerial problem was diagnosed based on the whole work plan
of the pre-merger group. The administration of mergers is difficult be-
cause it requires the organization of procedures with different complexity
levels that consequently require different levels of work within an admin-
istrative body such as CADE. This difficulty derives not only from
CADE, but also from the companies' representatives who submit their
mergers, leading to a volume of necessary information varying according
to the complexity level of the transaction. In the previous model, the
cases were essentially analyzed based on a "first come, first serve" ap-
proach, causing more complex cases to block the analysis of the majority
of simpler ones. 62
The central theme of the managerial innovations developed by the pre-
merger group was and continues to be to transform the system into a
continuous flow of analysis to avoid any interruptions in one of the units
of the General-Superintendence. 63 In order to transform the administra-
tion of the proceedings, it would first be necessary to organize the entry
of these proceedings into the General-Superintendence. This led to the
following managerial innovations introduced into CADE's General-
Superintendence.
A. CREATION OF A SPECIFIC SECTOR FOR THE TRIAGE OF MERGERS
Initially, the pre-merger transition group had to plan the new procedu-
ral flow within the General-Superintendence and decide the ideal organi-
zational structure in order for this flow to work in an efficient manner,
despite the scarce resources and slim chances of solution until the start of
the body.
A key element adopted by the General-Superintendence was the crea-
tion of the Triage sector, which continues to be tasked with identifying all
cases that clearly do not raise competition concerns and deciding those
61. See Statistics, INST. OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS ANI) ALLIANCES, http://www.imaa
-institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions.html#MergersAcquisitionsBrazil (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014).
62. See Laura Naime & Ligia Guimardes, Conhe(a os passos para aprovar ou rejeitar a
fusdo Sadia-Perdigdo [Learn the steps to approve or reject the merger Sadia, Perdi-
gao], GLOBO-SAO PAULO (May 20, 2009), at G1, available at http://gl.globo.com/
Noticias/EconomiaNegocios/0,,MUL1161471-9356,00-CONHECA+OS+PASSOS
+DO+CADE+PARA+APROVAR+OU+REJEITAR+A+FUSAO+SADIAPER
DIGAO.html; see also Daniela Barbosa, Caso Sadia-Perdigdo pode acelerar
mudanga na lei das fus~es e aquisiC6es [Sadia, Perdigao case can accelerate change
in the law of mergers and acquisitions], EXAME (June 9, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://
exame.abril.com.br/negocios/noticias/caso-sadia-perdigao-pode-acelerar-mudanca-
na-lei-das-fusoes-e-aquisicoes; see also Bruno Boris, CADE-decisdo que reprova
compra da Garoto pela Nestli [CA DE-decision disapproves purchase of Garoto by
Nestlj], MIGALHAS (Feb. 13, 2004), http://www.migalhas.com.br/dePeso/16,M13649
,71043-CADE+decisao+que+reprova+compra+da+Garoto+pela+Nestle.
63. ESCOLA NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA, supra note 50, at 191.
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cases within thirty days.64 This deadline was created by the leaderships of
the new CADE. Because more than 600 approvals using the fast track
procedure were made within thirty days, it is highly probable that this is
going to be incorporated into the body's Internal Regulations following
CADE's last regulation review.
The creation of a general department was a result of the fact that the
ratio of proceedings per technician is higher in Brazil than in many other
main foreign authorities. 65 This department was designed to "separate
the wheat from the chaff" or, more specifically, to separate the cases with
less potentially offensive effects on competition (a procedure called fast
tracking) from the cases that could negatively impact the competitive en-
vironment.66 This new institutional design broke up the structure
adopted in the previous model of a posteriori review. Even though the
fast track procedure has existed since the mid-2000s, none of three bodies
of the former SBDC had a specific sector for such an activity.
The use of two notification forms (one for fast track procedures and
the other for all other cases) helped the congestion of the Triage sector.
It comes down to a self-identification mechanism, which is one of the
64. See id.
65. According to the information found in the annual reports of some of the world's
most important antitrust agencies, in 2012, while CADE reviewed 660 cases with
the assistance of eighty-seven public servants (average of 7.58 cases per public ser-
vant), France reviewed 2013 with the assistance of ninety-nine public servants (av-
erage of 2.15 cases per public servant), Spain reviewed 113 cases with 106 public
servants (average of 1.06 public servants per case), Canada reviewed 232 cases
with 282 public servants (average of 0,82 cases per public servant), and the United
States of America reviewed 1.166 cases with the assistance of 722 public servants
(average of 1.61 cases per public servant). See MINISTEI.O DA JUsTICA [MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE], PRESITAQAO DE CONTAS ORDINARIA ANUAL: RETLATORIO DE GFSTAO
DO EXEROCIO ciE 2012 [PROvISION OF REGULAR ANNUAL ACCOUNTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR THE YEAR 2012], available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/RelatC3
% B3rio%20de%2OGest%C3%A3o%20de%202012_CADE vers%C3%A3o%20
final.pdf; see also AuToiuT- DEi LA CONCUIR.RENCE, PUSHING THE BOUNDARIFS
FOR A STRONG AND FAIRER ECONOMY: ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 2012, availa-
ble at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/synthese 2012_en.pdf (providing
France reviewed 2013 with the assistance of ninety-nine public servants); see also
COMISION NACIONAL DE LA COMPETENCIA, ANNUAL REPORT: 2011-2012, availa-
ble at http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/GestionDocumental/tabid/76/Default.
aspx?Entryld=186694&Command=CoreDownload&Method=attachment (pro-
viding Spain reviewed 113 cases with 106 public servants); see also COMPETITION
BUREAU CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT OF Ti-ll COMMISSIONER OF COMPETITION
FOR THE YFAR ENDING MARCHi 31, 2012, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-doc-ar-2011-12-e.pdf/$file/cb-doc-ar-201 l-12-e.pdf; see also
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE FTC IN 2012, http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/reports-annual/ftc-2012/ftc-highlights-2012.pdf (last visited Apr.
25, 2015).
66. The first time that the triage system was discussed with the international legal com-
munity was in the Merger Enforcement in The Americas Conference, which was
held on by the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Law Section, in conjunc-
tion with the International Section of the NYSBA, the Brazilian Institute on Com-
petition, Consumer Affairs, International Trade (Ibrac) and the Canadian Bar
Association, in New York on July 17, 2012. See Remarks by Melanie L. Aitken,
Commissioner of Competition, COM'ETITION BUREAU, July 17, 2012, http://www
.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03494.html.
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ways to organize the queue (commonly used in customer service sys-
tems). In case the company presents an ordinary case as a case for the
fast track procedure, it bears the risk of having its case amended and
ultimately rejected if there is a lack of necessary information. 67 This pos-
sibility of amendment and rejection discourages companies from supply-
ing misleading or incomplete information, leading to a more efficient
Triage sector.68
The Triage department is the core of the General-Superintendence's
intelligence and its role is to create and foster new management tech-
niques and substantive reviews of the mergers that are filed with CADE.
Because it receives all the mergers submitted to CADE, monitors trans-
actions that are occasionally not presented (whether mandatory), and
centralizes all the questions citizens may have regarding legal and infrale-
gal rules that regulate CADE's performance, the Triage department is
central to the pre-merger review. Furthermore, because it possesses a
broader vision of all the cases presented and of all the doubts already
answered, the Triage department serves as a communication bridge be-
tween the Brazilian antitrust community and the General-
Superintendence. 69
B. CREATION OF CGs, SPECIALIZED IN GROUPS OF SECTORS
BASED ON A "SCALE/SCOPE" LOGIC
The creation of a Triage sector was not the only managerial innovation
in terms of institutional design. The whole structure of the General-Su-
perintendence was developed to function organically, favoring scale and
scope gains with specialized departments (or "coordinations") in differ-
ent sectors of the economy. It also benefits not only from the accumu-
lated expertise both in regard to the review of mergers and to abuse of
dominance cases (another break from the previous system's structure),
67. Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.20113, art. 53
(Braz.).
68. The companies, motivated by a system of a posteriori analysis, which did not pre-
vent the conclusion of the intended transaction, made little efforts to present their
merger in a complete form with all necessary information for a correct analysis. To
the contrary, in cases that were notably more complex, it was obvious that the
parties intended to initially present the minimum amount of information possible,
submitting additional information as it was required by SBDC's bodies, through
information requests, which suspended the legal term imposed by Law 8.884 (30
days for each Secretariat and 60 days for CADE, with the possibility of interrup-
tion upon any request for supplementary information, both to the parties and to
third parties). After all, the longer the analysis, the more difficult it would be to
implement conditions for its approval, or even failure. This negative incentive
generated by the a posteriori analysis system also existed for the SBDC's employ-
ees who, pressured by the huge amount of transactions submitted and by the ex-
tremely short legal term, did not evade from sending requests for information,
which were sometimes, unnecessary to the analysis.
69. Since the enactment of the new competition law, the Triage has been mainly at the
service of antitrust law, basically answering questions on whether a given transac-
tion is of mandatory filing with CADE, as well as questions on whether a given
transaction can benefit from the fast-track proceeding.
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but also from the constant exchange of information between the
departments.
The creation of those specialized departments was based on empirical
work (CGAA 1 to 4). 70 Indexes with some variables71 were created based
on all the mergers (not fast tracked) reviewed by the Seae/MF between
2007 and 2011, as well as, on the stock of administrative proceedings (ex-
cept for cartels) from SDE/MJ in the beginning of 2012. These indexes
were aimed at evaluating the "good stock" for each of the new depart-
ments of the GS by analyzing this stock both according to the amount of
acts expected for each sector allocated in the departments and their de-
gree of difficulty. The indexes also consider the possible scale and scope
gains resulting from these divisions; analyzed both in terms of analysis of
mergers and of unilateral behaviors.
Because all of the general departments have the same legal compe-
tence, there is a constant exchange of technicians between them when-
ever there is the necessity for a task force in a certain case, or even for a
temporary reinforcement in a certain sector. This flexibility in the institu-
tional design also allows the structure of the General-Superintendence to
more easily adapt to the changing economy, enabling the technicians to
also adapt to the demand. It is important to highlight that the "scale/
scope" logic in the formatting of general departments of the General-
Superintendence is aligned with the organization of the line of mergers to
render the flow of analysis more efficient. 72
C. CREATION OF WORK FLOWS BASED ON DIFFERENT
DEGREES OF COMPLEXITY
The two previous innovations relate to the Triage department's struc-
ture, as well as the creation of the sectorial departments (with the help of
the two form models) and the goal of transforming stock into continuous
flow of analysis is summarized in Image 1 (below). It also reflects the
different treatment given to different degrees of complexity of the trans-
actions presented to CADE.
70. EsCOLA NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA, supra note 48, at 192-93.
71. For instance, average analysis time, average analysis time by sector, amount of
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Image 1-Mergers flow in the CADE's General-Superintendence
*Ordinary
The Triage department receives all the mergers and makes a first as-
sessment, in order to verify if all the information and documents
presented are enough for the start of the actual proceeding analysis. 73
After this, the transaction's notice is published in the Official Federal Ga-
zette, as well as on the CADE's website to give publicity of the transac-
tion to third parties.74 But if the merger is ordinary (not subject to the
fast track procedure), then the Triage department forwards the proceed-
ing directly to the general department responsible for its review. Initially,
this department will verify if all the information submitted is enough;
73. Id. at 193.
74. See Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.20113, art. 53
(Braz.).
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then it will go through all the stages of an act submitted under the fast
track procedure, as described Image 1. Afterwards, the department per-
forms all necessary market tests, and, as the review progresses, it can re-
quest more information from the parties. Regarding the mergers
submitted under the fast track procedure, if the Triage department be-
lieves that there is a lack of information for the start of the merger re-
view, then it can try to clarify through direct questions to the parties via
letters or phone calls. If the lack of information is essential for the con-
tinuation of the case, then the Triage department can opt for an
amendment.
After clarifying the questions during the initial proceeding of the analy-
sis, 75 the Triage department decides, together with the specialized coordi-
nator responsible for the review in the specific sector of the transaction
submitted and the Adjunct Superintendent, whether to proceed with the
review under the fast track procedure or to forward the transaction for
review under the ordinary procedure by the respective specialized depart-
ment. In the latter case, the decision by the GS to not grant the fast track
procedure to a transaction is discretionary.7 6 This only means that the
GS was not convinced, even after clarifications provided by the parties
and third parties, that the transaction potentially has a less severe impact
on competition; therefore, it requires a greater scrutiny by its team. In
some specific cases, even before the publishing of its notice, the Triage
department may request a waiver from the parties, 77 which allows the GS
to ask for information from third parties or other international antitrust
authorities upon authorization by the parties. The waiver, also used by
the other departments responsible for the ordinary acts, aims to speed up
the review before it is published via notice, especially in cases that raise
relevant questions, even if submitted under the fast track procedure.
These procedures aim to speed up the review term in one of two ways:
(1) through fast track procedure, which adheres to the thirty day dead-
75. This initial process does not necessarily refer to the procedures performed before
the publication of the notice. In some cases, the Triage may publish the notice, if it
understands that the parties have presented all the information available to them
to enable the start of the analysis of the transaction in the GS after diligences with
third parties (competitors, clients, suppliers etc.), it may decide, together with the
specialized coordination and the Adjunct Superintendent, not to continue the
analysis of this transaction under the fast track procedure in case the diligences
performed have not made clear the irrelevance of the transaction in competition
terms or even if these diligences have brought new doubts about the transaction.
In these cases, which are an exception to the rule, the GS determines, through an
order, that the transaction be changed to the ordinary procedure, and that new
information to be requested.
76. Resolu 5o No. 2, de 29 de Maio de 2012, D.O.U. de 5.31.2012, art.7 (Braz.), availa-
ble at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/Resolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o%202_2012%20
%20An%C3%Al lise%20Atos%20Concentra%C3%A7%C3%A3o.pdf.
77. Although CADE has not specifically regulated this issue, the waivers were
adopted based on the best practices of the world's top antitrust agencies. This
instrument has been used in several cases with international repercussions. See
No. 08700.006437/2012-1 Ato de Concentraqao, supra note 26; No. 08700.009882/
2012-35 Ato de Concentraqfo, supra note 26.
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line, starting from the day of submission of the act to CADE; or (2) under
ordinary procedure, under which the deadline depends on its level of
complexity, even though it is legally limited to 240 days with restricted
possibilities of extension.78
D. INSTITUTION OF THE "PRE-SUBMISSION" PHASE
Inspired by successful experiences in international antitrust authorities,
the transition team of the pre-merger group suggested the inclusion of a
provision in CADE's Internal Regulations79 aiming at establishing prior
meetings for the mergers that are not eligible for the fast track procedure.
These meetings allow the parties to present to the GS the general aspects
of the intended transaction, as well as their view of the possible impacts
on certain markets. This whole process is conducted in a secretive man-
ner, but in some cases the parties can waive secrecy to allow the authority
to access other international authorities or to allow the market to answer
questions raised.
Until now, this "pre-submission" phase has been generating positive
feedback within the scope of the General-Superintendence. The GS can
anticipate its first impressions of the transaction and information
presented up to that moment, avoiding, in the majority of cases, delays by
lack of information at the time of notice of the transaction to CADE
because it is in possession of the main aspects of the transaction, or in
many cases of a draft of the Annex 1 form of CADE's Resolution n. 02/
12. The main purpose of this stage is precisely to guarantee that the
transaction be presented in the most complete manner as possible, con-
siderably reducing the possibility of an amendment. This gain in quality
regarding the information of the transactions submitted, resulting from
the discussions during the pre-submission phase, have greatly contributed
to faster review terms in these cases.
E. SYSTEM OF "CHECKS & BALANCES"
In order to supplement the flow described above, a system of "checks
& balances" was created for all mergers reviewed under the fast track
procedure, which currently represent 90 percent of all the analyses ever
conducted by the Superintendence. The central idea resides in using the
expertise accumulated in the four general departments that deal with or-
dinary mergers for a counter-check of the analyses undertaken by the
78. In May 2014, the average term of analysis of a merger in the GS was sixty-seven
days. In sixty-three cases already examined under the ordinary procedure in the
GS, ever since the new law has come into force, the biggest term was 184 days,
related to a transaction challenged in the Tribunal (CA n. 08700.006437/2012-13),
and that was decided through a commitment (ACC-Concentrations Control
Agreement). See Escol-A NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRA;AO PUNBLICA, supra note
50.
79. See Regimento Interno Do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [The
Internal Rules of the Board Economic Defense] de 07 de outubro de 2014, art. 114
(Braz.).
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Triage's department under the fast track procedure. Additionally, this
flow allows these departments to constantly exchange experiences of
their analyses, facilitate the internal communication, and grant more
quality and legal certainty to the GS's decisions.
This system works in the following way: after the development of the
opinion on a transaction under the fast track procedure by a technician in
the Triage's department, the opinion is evaluated by its general coordina-
tor. Then, the Triage's general coordinator submits its fast track opinion
for a revision by the general coordinator responsible for the analyses in
the economic sector affected by that opinion. When revising the opinion
issued by the Triage department, the general coordinator may suggest al-
terations or supplementations, may give its approval without alterations,
and even request new diligences. The coordinator may also determine
that the merger is not eligible for the fast track procedure, causing the
transaction examined by the Triage department to be more accurately
scrutinized for its coordination.80 But in case this general revising coordi-
nator gives its approval to the opinion issued by the Triage department, it
is then forwarded to the Adjunct Superintendent responsible for monitor-
ing the mergers, who will proceed in a similar fashion as this revising
coordinator. Only after the approval of the expedited opinion by the Ad-
junct Superintendent, is the merger submitted for final approval by the
General-Superintendent. 8 '
IV. RESULTS
The critics were wrong. Past the initial works phase, with the first and
very satisfactory results, there was no shortage of compliments to the new
CADE's performance. Various national and international publications
highlighted the promising start of the new system. The very Exame mag-
azine, about three months after its piece that carried heavy criticism,
completely reversed the setting, with a long piece praising the start of the
new CADE. This piece was titled, "A promising start for the Supercade,"
with the subtitle "in a little over two months, Supercade has prevailed
over the skepticism and makes its debut approving the acquisition of
companies in record time. The Brazilian economy says thanks. '8 2 But
there were also many other pieces complimenting this "promising start"
highlighted by Exame, with several positive statements by lawyers who
80. See Escol-A NACIONAL I)1 AI)MINISTRA;AO PJ13LICA, supra note 50, at 187.
81. It is worth noting that although this internal checks & balances system is not pro-
vided for in any specific rule, it was adopted internally by the GS with the purpose
of guaranteeing both speed and quality in merger reviews, while encouraging in-
formation spill-overs between the departments. This process was based on Chap-
ter 3: Knowledge Management of the Agency Effectiveness Handbook. See
generally INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWOIRK, AGENCY Ei-1E(I'-rivu HAND-
1300K (2013) available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/
library/doc894.pdf.
82. See Patrick Cruz, Um comefo promissor para o Supercade [A promising start to the
Supercade], EXAME (Aug. 9, 2012, 05:55 AM), http://exame.abril.com.br/revista-
exame/noticias/um-comeco-promissor-para-o-supercade.
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work in the field: The Economist, Carta Capital, Reuters, Valor Econ6m-
ico, among others.83 But which results motivated this change?
A. RESULTS DURING THE TRANSITION TO THE PRE-MERGER MODEL
Before beginning its journey under new legislation and under a new
model of pre-merger analysis, as a reflection of all the tension created
before Law 12.529/11 and during the final period of submission of cases
under the old model (a posteriori review, where the parties could con-
clude the transaction before the approval by CADE), fifteen work days
after May 28, 2012, which marked the last day of effectiveness of Law
8.884/94, 141 mergers were presented. 84 Besides these 141 transactions
submitted over a period of less than one month, more than 100 mergers
were inherited from Seae without the conclusion of its opinion because
this body was no longer in charge of reviewing mergers after the new law
came into force. 85
But the difficulties did not stop there. During this transition period
between the two laws, headquarters changed and the adaptation reforms
were delayed for about three weeks, leaving the whole body practically
without the minimal structural conditions for work. Nevertheless, none
of these cases were delayed because the legal term for their analysis
started counting from the day of notice, as established in Law 8.884/94,
and the deadline would have to be met, with or without the structure. 86
Right from the beginning, the Triage's department started working,
separating all transactions eligible for a fast track treatment from the
ones that deserved greater scrutiny. This activity was conducted in about
two weeks. With the collaboration of all teams responsible for the review
of mergers at CADE, the result could not have been better. All the
transactions that benefitted from the fast track procedure (approximately
70 percent) were reviewed by the GS in less than thirty days; until the end
of 2012, almost all of the 141 cases submitted had already been examined
by the CADE's GS.87 In April 2013, the GS's stock of mergers presented
under Law 8.884/94 had ended. In May 2014, there were only three
mergers, submitted under Law 8.884/94 left for the tribunal's analysis. 88
In June 2012, mergers started to be filed already under the new pre-
merger analysis model. This marked the beginning of the test of the inno-
vations of the new CADE. The results were extremely positive. The first
83. See id.; see also A Champion for Choice?, supra note 1; Por Leonardo Goy, Cade
julga mais de 800 casos de fusdo e aquisiqdo em 2012 [Cade thinks more than 800
cases of mergers and acquisitions in 2012], Riuri nis BRASIL (Dec. 12, 2012, 11:26
AM), http://br.reuters.com/article/idBRSPE8BB03F20121212; Cade julga maior
ndmero de casos em um ano [Cade believes more cases in a year], VALOR ECONoM-
ico (Dec.12, 2012, 7:19 PM), http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/2938174/cade-
julga-maior-numero-de-casos-em-um-ano.
84. See generally EscoL-A NACIONAL I)F ADMINISTRAQAO PUI3I ICA, supra note 48.
85. See id.
86. See Lei No. 8.884/94, supra note 3, art. 54, paras. 6, 7 (repealed 2012).
87. See EscoLA NACIONAL im ADMINISTRAC AO PUBRUCA, supra note 50.
88. See id.
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case approved under the fast track procedure took twenty-seven days.8 9
Right after that, another three cases took less than fifteen days each.90 In
the first three months of the new CADE, the average term for the analy-
sis of the fast track cases was approximately twenty days.91 As to the
ordinary ones, the success was also immediate. The first one was ap-
proved in forty-eight days,92 and the second within fifty days. 9 3 In the
first six months that Law 12.529/11 became effective, the average term for
the review of ordinary mergers was forty-one days.
B. RESULTS AFTER THE TRANSITION FOR THE PRE-MERGER MODEL
Since the new law, the average terms for the fast track cases have con-
tinued to stay close to the initial average, even with the significant in-
crease of cases submitted in 2013. But the average terms for the ordinary
cases slightly increased mostly due to the degree of difficulty of some of
them. Ten of those cases were sent to the Tribunal with a challenge by
the GS. 94 The average term for the ordinary cases between 2012 and
May 2014 was approximately sixty-seven days in the GS (eighty-seven
days total including review terms of the transactions decided by the Tri-
bunal),95 complying with the international standards of leading antitrust
agencies in the world.96
Below, we show the main statistics from CADE after Law 12.529 came
into force, up until May 2014.
89. See Ato de Concentraqfo No. 08700.003962/2012-87 de 09 de julho de 2012 CADE
(Braz.), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/D-D00000675581971.pdf.
90. See Barbara Rosenberg, Brazil: The Enactment of the New Brazilian Competition
Law: An Important Shift, MONDAo, http://www.mondaq.com/x/253956/Antitrust+
Competition/The+Enactment+Of+The+New+Brazilian+Competition+Law+An+
Important (last updated Aug. 26, 2013). This indicates that the fast track review
takes less than thirty days for approval by the CADE.
91. See CA EscoL-A NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRAQAO PABLICA, supra note 50, at 197.
92. See Ato de Concentraq.o No. 08700.006962/2012-39, de 16 outobro de 2012 CON-
SEL1o A)MINIs-rRATIVO DEl DEFFSA ECONOMICA (Braz.), available at http://www
.cade.gov.br/temp/DD000000704881564.pdf.
93. See Ato de Concentraq.o No. 08700.005310/2012-87, de 01 de Novembro de 2012
CONSrLHO ADMINISTRATIvo DE DFESA ECONOMICA (Braz.), available at http://
www.cade.gov.br/temp/D_D000000708581248.pdf.
94. This figure takes into account the time elapsed between the coming into force of
Law 12.529/11 and May 2014.
95. See Lei No. 12.529/11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 53
(Braz.); See also ResolucAo No. 1, de 29 de Maio de 2012, D.O.U. de 31.5.2012, art.
111 (Braz.).
96. See generally Howard W. Fogt, et al, Timely Merger Clearance Becomes Increas-
ingly Problematic As Complex Rules and Procedures for Required Approvals
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Graphic 1-Comparison between the average merger review terms (Law
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Table 1-Statistics from CADE's General-Superintendence
(2012 to 2014)
No. Fast No. No. Average No. Average
Track Ordinary Summary Time - Ordinary Time -
Year (Entry)* (Entry)* Opinions Fast Track Opinions Ordinary Total
2012 121 17 106 18,7 8 41,3 138
2013 334 41 319 19,4 32 65,1 375
2014"* 124 21 131 21,1 23 78,3 145
*including cases withdrawn
**data updated up to 20 May
2014 658
Source: CADE-Data updated up to May 20, 2014.
Table 2-Average terms of the General-Superintendence only regarding
ordinary cases (distributed by brackets of terms of discovery)
Representativeness
Brackets Number of Cases Average (days) (M)
Considering all cases 63 67 100
taking out only the ones
challenged by the GS (07)
taking out only the ones above 51 84
100 days (10)
taking out only the ones above
67 days (general average term) 42 44 67
(21)
taking out only the ones above 29 39 46
50 days (34)
Source: CADE -Data updated up to 20 May 2014.
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As easily noticable from the data presented above, the efficiency gain
in the new prior analysis of mergers in comparison to the former system is
undeniable. In as early as the first year, the decrease was drastic, going
from an average term of 154 days in 2011 to twenty-one days in 2012
(representing approximately an 86 percent decrease in terms). Equally
important, the average review period remained steady from 2012 on-
wards, but the number of transactions considerably increased in 2013 and
until May 2014. Currently, this average term is twenty-six days. It must
be stressed that this term counts in all the procedures (fast track and ordi-
nary) and also encompasses the discovery period carried out by the GS,
as well as the ruling period by the Tribunal. In regards to ordinary cases,
the term includes the period carried out by the GS and the Tribunal,
which accounts for an average review term in April 2014 of eighty-one
days-still below the maximum term (240 days, which can be extended
for 90 more days) established by law. It should be noted that only one
merger 97 decision surpassed the 240 day deadline among the 619 current
decisions. 98
In relation to the ordinary cases, Table 2 clearly shows that the vast
majority of the sixty-three cases already instructed by the GS had an
analysis review term shorter than 100 days and also shorter than the gen-
eral average (sixty-seven days in the GS). In the first case, only ten anal-
yses surpassed 100 days, which means that over 84 percent of the cases
were solved in a shorter time frame. In the second case, only twenty-one
analyses surpassed sixty-seven days, which is the current average term for
ordinary cases in the GS and means that almost 70 percent of the cases
were solved in a term shorter than the average. Further, almost half (46
percent) of the total amount of ordinary cases already examined by the
Superintendence was below fifty days.
There are also five ordinary cases that were approved in a shorter term
than the maximum term determined for the fast track procedure, which is
thirty days. Finally, of the ten cases that surpassed 100 days of review, the
"outliers" in the universe of ordinary cases already examined by the GS,
six were challenged by the Tribunal (five of which with a declaration of
complexity)9 9 and the other four had problems in the presentation of in-
97. This was the case of the merger between the higher education institutions,
Anhanguera and Kroton, which had its term extended upon request by the Tribu-
nal, having used 301 days until its final decision, for the approval conditional upon
the fulfillment of a number of measures provided for in a Concentrations Control
Agreement (CCA), entered into by CADE and the claimants. See Ato de Concen-
traq:o No. 08700.005447/2013-12, de 06 de maio de 2014 CONSEH-iO ADMINISTRA-
nVOji Dr. DEFFSA ECONOMICA (Braz.), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/temp/
D_D000000776091737.pdf.
98. Data updated to 20 May 2014. See generally EscoLA NACIONAL Di- ADMINISTRA-
CAO POBLICA, supra note 50.
99. Article 120 of CADE's Internal Regulations, which creates the "declaration of
complexity," as to regulate the GS' request for an extension of term provided for
in §2 of Article 88 of Law 12.529/11. Article 120 establishes in its main section that
"The General-Superintendence may, through a duly reasoned decision, declare the
transaction as a complex one and determine the realization of a new supplemen-
2015]
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formation by the parties (some of those were even initially submitted as
fast track). It should also be stressed that, even if we add up the terms
used by the Tribunal to judge the cases that were challenged by the GS
until May 2014 (ten in total) or that were arrogated by them (three),
these averages would not be significantly altered.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the good performance by CADE in
the analysis of mergers generated a positive impact on its repressive mis-
sion concerning the fight against anticompetitive behaviors, especially
cartels. In 2013, CADE judged the greatest number of proceedings refer-
ring to anti-competitive behaviors registered in the last years-thirty-
eight cases (as per Graphic 2 below). Of these, twenty-two were con-
victed, including thirteen cartel cases. In total, the penalties applied by
CADE add up to R$4916 million.1 00 These values are sent to the Collec-
tive Rights Protection Fund and they may return to society under the
form of financing of projects regarding the protection of consumer rights,
the environment, historical and cultural heritage, among others.
Ever since the creation of the new law, the GS concluded the analysis
of 271 behavioral cases, filing them or forwarding them for ruling by the
Tribunal. 10 1 The stock of behaviors inherited from SDE by the new
CADE, which was 444 proceedings on May 29, 2012, has been reduced to
296 in May 2014, also including the ones initiated during this period.
10 2
Graphic 2-Anticompetitive behaviors cases judged by CADE
from 2010 to 2014
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tary investigation, specifying the diligences to be performed." See Lei No. 12.529/
11, de 30 de Novembro de 2011 D.O.U. de 30.11.2011, art. 88, § 2 (Braz.); see also
Resolucao No. 1, de 29 de Maio de 2012, D.O.U. de 31.5.2012, art. 120 (Braz.).
100. CADE, BALANCE 2013 14 (2014), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/
Balan%C3%A7o%202013%20.pdf.
101. See ESCOLA NACIONAL DE ADMINISTRA AO POBLICA, supra note 50, at 199.
102. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
As explained throughout this paper, the legal revision of the Brazilian
Competition Protection System addressed the structural "bottlenecks"
that hindered the execution of the Brazilian antitrust policy in a satisfac-
tory manner. The data presented speaks for itself. In only one year, the
average term of analysis of mergers was reduced by over 80 percent, com-
pared to the best average reached during the effectiveness of Law 8.884/
94 and not to its historical average. Further, the productivity gains in the
analysis of mergers reached by CADE in these two first years also re-
flected directly on its repressive role with considerable gains in the num-
bers related to the fight against cartels and other unilateral behaviors.
These results motivated a series of recognition acts concerning CADE's
managerial innovations.
After the internal public and, mainly, the agents in the Brazilian anti-
trust policy demonstrated their recognition of the new bodies' good start,
the international antitrust community also took notice of the improve-
ments. The "Global Competition Review" (GCR), an important interna-
tional newspaper on competition protection in their annual ranking of
antitrust agencies, granted in 2013 another half star to the new CADE,
which already had 3.5 stars in the previous year, hoisting it to the top ten
of the competition authorities in the world.10 3 Brazil went from the 13th
position to the 8th position, going from the "good" category to the "very
good" category, only behind renowned agencies such as the United States
(FTC and DOJ), the European Commission, England (UK's Competition
Commission), Germany, France, and Japan. It boosted Brazil to the same
level as Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, and England (UK's Office of
Fair Trade), and ahead of Canada, Korea, Italy, and New Zealand. Out
of developing countries, Brazil appears in the first place. 10 4 CADE's
main highlights in the evaluation made by GCR were (i) success in the
transition to Law 12.529/11; (ii) prior analysis of mergers; (iii) new notifi-
cation criteria; (iv) analysis of fast track mergers in an average term of 19
days-one of the fastest in the world; and (v) the refining of the fight
against cartels. 10 5
Towards the end of November 2013, the project, referring to the new
process of analysis of mergers, was ranked within the ten first places
(among 102 registered) in the 18th competition of innovation in the pub-
lic service, promoted by the National School of Public Administration
(ENAP) in partnership with the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Man-
agement (MPOG), which was unprecedented for CADE. 10 6 The purpose
of the competition, which has been promoted for seventeen years, is to
103. See Rating Enforcement 2013, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., http://www.autoritede-
laconcurrence.fr/doc/gcr ratingl3.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Information on this partnership was released by TVNBR, a Brazilian TV news
agency, on April 10, 2014. See Iniciativa reduz tempo de andlise de processos na
drea de defesa econ6mica [Initiative reduces analysis time of economic processes in
2015]
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stimulate the dissemination of innovative solutions in organizations of the
Federal Government. On April 8, 2014, at an event taking place in
ENAP's headquarters, CADE was ranked 7th and obtained the innova-
tion stamp, an already renowned brand in the Brazilian federal public
service for the recognition of managerial practices, which have promoted
innovations of proven efficiency in their fields of action.10 7
In conclusion, the managerial innovations refined the use of the institu-
tion's human capital (always very scarce in the public sector), privileged
the internal communication and the information flow-splitting responsi-
bilities among all involved in an empowerment process, which generates
the feeling of belonging to the organization for the whole group and, con-
sequently, creates greater motivation and a good organizational atmos-
phere. 10 8 The costs involved in its development were low'0 9 because it
did not rely on complex information technology systems and completely
focused on the human material available, which may very well be repro-
duced in other bodies that have great volumes of demands with different
complexity levels that are above the team's production capacity. 110
the area of defense], YouTunE (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=wiQv5doYxQ4.
107. The complete video of the award ceremony, which includes presentations on all
the projects that were awarded that year, was released by TVNBR on April 9,
2014. See Premio reconhece iniciativas inovadoras implantadas na Administragdo
Federal [Award recognizes innovative initiatives implemented in the Federal Ad-
ministration], YouTum- (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbFyn
OxONM.
108. See ESCOLA NACIONAL I7 ADMINISTRA :AO PiOBLICA, supra note 50, at 204.
109. See id. at 195.
110. See id. at 194-95, 203-04.
